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A general theory is developed to analyze the efficiency and income distribution effects of a 
biofuel consumer tax credit and the interaction effects with a price contingent farm subsidy. 
Using the U.S. ethanol market as a stylized example, ethanol prices rise above the gasoline price 
by the amount of the tax credit. Corn farmers therefore gain directly while gasoline consumers 
only gain from any reduction in world oil prices due to the extra ethanol production and domestic 
oil producers lose. Because increased ethanol production improves the terms of trade in both the 
export of corn and the import of oil, we determine the optimal tax credit and the conditions 
affecting it.  
 
Historically, the intercept of the ethanol supply curve is above the gasoline price. Hence, part of 
the tax credit is redundant and represents ‘rectangular’ deadweight costs. The tax credit reduces 
the tax costs of price supports but incurs tax costs itself and increases consumer costs of corn. 
Price supports eliminate, create, have no effect or have an ambiguous effect on rectangular 
deadweight costs, depending on whether there is ex ante or ex post water in the tax credit. There 
are situations where ethanol production occurs only because of price supports.   
 
A stylized empirical model of the U.S. corn market is calibrated to illustrate the welfare effects 
of a tax credit.  Net social costs of the tax credit averaged $683 million. Rectangular deadweight 
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The Welfare Economics of an Excise-Tax Exemption for Biofuels 
 
1. Introduction 
Biofuels have generated a great deal of interest worldwide as a solution to a host of 
problems, ranging from reducing dependency on oil and tax costs of farm programs to improving 
farm incomes and environmental quality (Miranowski 2007; Zilberman 2007). Ambitious goals 
on the use of biofuels are being set in many countries, including developing countries (Jank et al. 
2007; Kojima and Johnson 2006, Rajagopal and Zilberman 2007). In addition to grants, 
guaranteed loans and tax incentives for the production of biofuels, many governments exempt 
biofuels from consumer excise taxes to help achieve targets on biofuel use.1 Along with high oil 
prices, the tax exemption for ethanol facilitated the increase in demand for agricultural 
commodities in U.S. biofuel production (Tyner 2007).2  Although ethanol accounted for only 4 
percent of transportation fuel consumption and 20 percent of total corn use in 2006, the rapidly 
expanding production of ethanol has resulted in sharp increases in the price of corn. As well, the 
increase in resources devoted to corn production has pushed up prices of other commodities that 
compete with corn for land, are substitutes in demand for corn or use corn as an input (Elobeid et 
al. 2007).  This has a direct adverse effect on the users of these crops, including livestock 
industries and consumers in developing countries (Runge and Senauer 2007).  Meanwhile, 
increased market prices reduced the tax costs of price contingent farm subsidies.  
This paper develops a prototype welfare theoretic framework to analyze the efficiency 
and income distribution effects of a biofuel consumption tax credit and the interaction effects 
with price contingent production subsidies.  Following Gardner (2003), we analyze the U.S. 
ethanol tax credit and loan deficiency payments as a stylized example to empirically illustrate the 
implications of the model.  Unlike in Gardner (2003), where the tax credit is modeled as an 
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ethanol production subsidy reducing market prices for ethanol, our model has the tax credit 
providing an incentive for gasoline blenders to bid up the market price of ethanol above the 
market price of gasoline by the amount of the tax.  Hence, the market price of ethanol and corn 
are positively related.  Gasoline consumers only gain from the reduction in world oil prices due 
to the extra ethanol production while domestic oil producers lose.  Because increased ethanol 
production improves the terms of trade in both the export of corn and the import of oil, we 
determine the optimal tax credit and the conditions affecting it.3 
One bushel of corn produces 2.8 gallons of ethanol so the tax credit translates into a 
potential $1.43 per bushel increase in the corn price.  Except in times of very high oil prices, the 
intercept of the ethanol supply curve is above the market price of ethanol that would occur 
without the tax credit.  This means a significant part of the tax credit can be redundant.  This 
‘water’ in the tax credit represents ‘rectangular’ deadweight costs, defined as that part of the cost 
of the tax credit that is not a transfer to corn producers.  Therefore, any terms of trade 
improvements in the export of corn and import of oil can easily be eliminated. 
Using a stylized empirical model of the U.S. corn market to illustrate the potential 
welfare effects of a tax credit, rectangular deadweight costs averaged $1,067 mil. from 2001 to 
2006.4 The tax costs of the tax credit averaged $1,813 mil.  This means that more than 50 percent 
of the tax costs due to the tax credit were rectangular deadweight costs.  
Although the tax credit reduces taxpayer costs of price contingent farm subsidies, the net 
gain in taxpayer monies is ambiguous.  Furthermore, tax savings in farm subsidies are replaced 
by increases in costs to corn consumers and by part of the tax costs of the tax credit. The other 
part of the tax credit’s cost to taxpayers represent rectangular deadweight costs.  
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The effect of the loan rate on rectangular deadweight costs are to both increase and 
decrease it (net effect is ambiguous), to eliminate it, to create it, or to have no impact at all. The 
outcome depends on whether the market price of corn is above or below the price that would 
prevail without ethanol production, and on whether there is water in the tax credit with the loan 
rate.  There are situations where ethanol production occurs only because of price supports.    
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops the general theoretical 
model while Section 3 analyzes the interaction effects between the tax credit and price supports.  
Section 4 presents an algebraic formulation of the general theory while Section 5 presents the 
empirical results, including the effects of a variable tax credit.  The last section provides some 
concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical Model 
A key aspect of analyzing the corn-oil market interface is the equilibrium breakeven price 
of corn.  Figure 1 summarizes estimates by Tyner (2007) and Elobeid et al. (2006) of a linear 
relationship between the corn and oil price.  These estimates of the breakeven curve differ, but 
the slopes are nearly identical and approximate the logarithmic trend in ethanol prices.  Linearity 
suggests that there are constant returns to scale in ethanol production and that the oil price is 
invariant to ethanol production.5  In the analysis to follow, we assume the former but allow for 
an endogenous oil price in the theory section only.  Tyner (2007) also shows that ethanol has an 
additive value as an oxygenate and octane enhancer.  This additive value is assumed to be fixed 
in our model and is normalized to zero.  We also assume ethanol imports to be exogenous as 
international trade in biofuels has been small (IPC 2006).  Except for episodes of very high U.S. 
ethanol prices, most imports into the United States normally come through a preferential trading 
arrangement with Caribbean countries and are limited by an import quota.  
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Denote the U.S. corn supply curve by SC and total demand for non-ethanol corn by DNE 
(Figure 2).  Their intersection determines the price of corn PNE that occurs with no ethanol 
production.  The excess supply of corn for ethanol production SE is given in panel (b) of Figure 
2.  Denote Sd as the domestic supply curve for gasoline.  This along with the import supply curve 
generates a total gasoline supply curve SF.  Since the intercept of the ethanol supply curve is 
assumed to be above the price of gasoline PG, the supply curve SF is of gasoline only. The 
intersection with the domestic demand for fuel DF solves for PG, the market price of gasoline.6  
In this situation, the corn price PC equals PNE and is not related to oil prices.                        
 Define t as the 51 cent per gallon tax credit to refiners for using ethanol with gasoline. 
Competition among refiners will ensure that the market price of ethanol will rise and equal PG + 
t, the price paid by consumers of gasoline.  The supply curve for ethanol shifts down by the 
amount of the tax credit t to S'E.  The new fuel supply curve becomes S'F such that domestic oil 
production and imports fall to OG and GH, respectively. The new level of fuel (ethanol and 
gasoline) consumption is OJ, resulting in gasoline and corn prices of P'G and PC, respectively.  
The corn price is now equal to the gasoline price plus the tax credit of $1.43 per bushel.7  
Gasoline consumers only gain from the consumption tax credit through the reduction in 
world oil prices due to the extra ethanol production. The tax credit raises the price to corn 
producers and non-ethanol corn consumers (an equal production subsidy and consumption tax) 
by PC – PG, which is less than the tax credit t because of (a) possible water in the tax credit equal 
to PNE - PG (the difference between the intercept of the ethanol supply curve and initial price of 
gasoline); and (b) the reduction in fuel prices due to ethanol production of P'G - PG.  The tax 
credit therefore reduces gasoline use by the distance HI in Figure 2 and increases fuel 
consumption by IJ.   
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Non-ethanol consumers of corn transfer area a to corn producers while taxpayers transfer 
area b + c + d plus the hatched and cross-hatched areas.8  The hatched area represents 
rectangular deadweight costs of the tax credit while the cross-hatched area represents the transfer 
from taxpayers to fuel consumers due to the decline in fuel prices resulting from increased 
ethanol production.  Corn producer surplus increases by area a + b + c and the deadweight costs 
of overproduction is given by area d. 
Water in the tax credit varies year to year as it depends critically on both PNE (market 
conditions in the corn market) and the price of gasoline (market conditions in the oil market).  
For example, a large increase in the price of oil will reduce water in the tax credit and may even 
eliminate it.  If so, the rectangular deadweight costs disappear and become part of the transfer to 
corn farmers.  Denote w as the water in the tax credit: w = PNE – PG.  If oil prices are low enough, 
water can equal the entire tax credit. Note also that w = t – (PC – PNE) – (PG – P'G).  Oil prices 
have to increase by more than the water, w, before all water in the tax credit t is squeezed out.  
Figure 3 presents a more detailed explanation of the various costs and benefits of the tax 
credit.  Panel (a) shows domestic oil production to be OG, oil imports to be GH and ethanol 
consumption to be HJ (letters corresponding to that in Figure 2).  Domestic oil producers lose 
revenues of area e + f + g while the international terms of trade improvement in oil imports is 
area f + g + h.9  The terms of trade improvement from increased ethanol production in oil prices 
is captured by domestic consumers and is given by area i + j + k (corresponding to the cross 
hatched area in panel (a) of Figure 2).  The gain by domestic gasoline consumers from taxpayers 
is due to the international terms of trade effect for oil.  The gain in consumer surplus is the sum 
of all areas denoted in panel (a) of Figure 3 less area k (the deadweight costs of over-
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consumption) while the international gains from trade in the oil market is offset by area f (the 
deadweight costs of underproduction of domestic oil). 
The detailed breakdown of welfare effects in the corn market is depicted in panel (b) of 
Figure 3.  Denote the domestic demand for non-ethanol corn by Dd.  The transfer to corn 
producers from domestic non-ethanol corn consumers is area l while transfers from importers of 
U.S. corn is area n + q.10  Deadweight costs of under-consumption is given by area n.  The cross 
hatched area is identical to that in panel due to because of increased ethanol production induced 
by the tax credit that displaces gasoline consumption.  Corn producers only get the full benefit of 
the tax credit t if the price of oil is fixed and there is no water in the tax credit.  There are four 
deadweight cost triangles (areas f and k in Figure 3a; area n in Figure 3b and area d in Figure 2b).  
Net U.S. social welfare can be positive with a tax credit because of these two international terms 
of trade improvements.  The U.S. import tariff on ethanol may also improve their terms of trade 
in world ethanol markets.  Adding a foreign excess supply curve of ethanol to the model would 
allow one to analyze this.  Finally, there may be more net social gains if we include the effects of 
the tax credit subsidy in reducing price contingent subsidies for corn.  We take this issue up in 
the next section.  
3. Interaction Effects between a Tax Credit and Price Contingent Farm Subsidies 
There are two particularly important issues to analyze: the impact of the tax credit on the 
tax costs of the loan rate program, and the impact of the loan rate on the tax costs of the tax 
credit, including that part which is rectangular deadweight costs. The analysis assumes oil prices 
are exogenous so the market price for corn PC is determined by the price of gasoline plus the tax 
credit.11 
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Consider first the case in Figures 4a,b where the observed market price for corn PC is 
above PNE, the corn price with no ethanol production. If the tax credit is the only policy in effect, 
then the taxpayer costs are t·(QC – CNE) where QC is production with the tax credit only and CNE 
is non-ethanol corn consumption.  If the loan rate is the only policy in place, then the tax costs 
are (L – PL)·QL where L is the loan rate (guaranteed price to producers), QL is corn production 
with the loan rate and PL is the market price of corn without the tax credit. Tax costs with both 
the tax credit t and loan rate are L,  
(1) (L – PC)·QL + t·(QL – CNE) 
The loan rate in this case (Figures 4a,b) has no impact on non-ethanol corn consumption. The 
first term of equation (1) denotes the tax costs of the deficiency payments independent of the tax 
credit.  We therefore focus on the second term.  We know that t can be expressed as, 
(2) t = PC - PG = (PC - PL) + (PL - PG) 
Therefore, the gross tax savings of deficiency payments due to the tax credit is given by, 
(3) (PC – MAX[PL, PG])·QL 
Let us consider the case of Figure 4a only where PL > PG. The components of QL in equation (3) 
are given by, 
(4) QL = CNE + (QC – CNE) + (QL –QC) 
Using each of the right hand terms of (4) with (3), we can breakdown the different components 
of the tax savings in deficiency payments due to the tax credit.  To begin, part of the tax savings 
represents increased costs to consumers of corn (both domestic and foreign), 
(5) (PC - PL)·CNE 
Another part of the tax costs of the tax credit is independent of the deficiency payment program, 
(6) (PC - PL)·(QC - CNE) 
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but some of the tax costs of the tax credit are due to the deficiency program, (PC – PG)·(QL - QC). 
For now, let us focus only on that part of the loan rate’s contribution to the tax costs of the tax 
credit which cancels with the reduction in tax costs of the loan rate due to the tax credit, namely  
(7) (PC - PL)·(QL - QC) 
The increased costs in equations (5) – (7) exactly cancel the reductions in the tax costs of the 
deficiency payment program due to the tax credit given by equation (3).  However, there are tax 
costs of the tax credit yet unaccounted for that are above and beyond the tax savings in 
deficiency payments. These are the tax costs that represent rectangular deadweight costs and are 
given by, 
(8) (PL – PG)·(QL - CNE) 
Define water in the presence of the loan rate as wL = PL – PG which is always less than the water 
without a loan rate w = PNE – PG.  Because of the water, the shaded area in Figure 4a represents 
that part of the tax costs of the tax credit that are deadweight costs. The second term in 
parentheses of equation (8) can be re-written as, 
(9) QL - CNE = (QC - CNE) + (QL - QC) 
Using each term in (9) and combining with (8), we can therefore identify two components of the 
extra tax costs due to the tax credit that are beyond the savings in tax costs of deficiency 
payments due to the tax credit.  The first of these is the rectangular deadweight cost of the tax 
credit regardless of deficiency payments, 
(10) wL·(QC - CNE) 
followed by the rectangular deadweight costs of the tax credit due to the deficiency payment 
program, 
(11) wL·(QL - QC) 
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To summarize, the tax savings of the deficiency payment program in equation (3) are 
offset by increased consumer costs and tax costs of the tax credit policy given in equations (5) – 
(7) that exclude the additional rectangular deadweight costs described in equations (10) – (11).  
This is only relevant for the case in Figure 4a. Nevertheless, part of the increased consumer costs 
in equation (5) is to foreign importers of U.S. corn exports, thereby increasing the U.S. 
international terms of trade in corn export markets.  These terms of trade gains can more than 
offset the additional rectangular deadweight costs, depending on market parameters.  We discuss 
this further in the empirical section later. 
The net savings in total taxpayer costs due to the tax credit is ambiguous in theory and 
depends on the relative size of (PC – PL)·CNE versus wL·(QL - CNE). Given that the share of corn 
used in ethanol production is historically much lower than all other uses of corn, it is likely that 
the tax credit results in a net savings in tax costs. This may change in the future however as 
ethanol production increases along with market prices of corn. Nevertheless, the reduced tax 
costs are more than offset by higher prices to consumers and rectangular deadweight costs.  
So far we have shown that part of the existing rectangular deadweight costs is due to 
deficiency payments.  Let us now examine the effect of the deficiency payments on rectangular 
deadweight costs in general. The loan rate expands output by QL – QC.  The rectangular 
deadweight costs with the tax credit t only are: 
w·(QC – CNE) 
The rectangular deadweight costs with both the tax credit t and loan rate L are: 
wL·(QL – CNE) 
Hence, rectangular deadweight costs increase by wL·(QL – QC) and decrease by (PNE – PL)(QC – 
CNE).  The net effect of the loan rate on rectangular deadweight costs is therefore ambiguous. 
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An exogenous increase in the price of oil will reduce water and increase market price for 
corn, with the reduced non-ethanol corn consumption diverted to ethanol use.  A decrease in the 
tax credit has exactly the opposite effect.  Note that the effects of these exogenous changes in the 
oil price and tax credit are the same for each of the cases examined in Figures 4-5. 
However, the analysis so far assumes water with the loan rate is positive ex ante and ex 
post.  Figure 4b depicts the case where the initial water, w = PNE – PG, is eliminated with the 
introduction of the loan rate so the loan rate unambiguously reduces rectangular deadweight 
costs in this situation. Otherwise, the analysis above in equations (1) – (7) holds for the case 
depicted in Figure 4b as well. 
The analysis so far in Figures 4a,b assumes positive ethanol production with no loan rate.  
However, this may not be the case as it is possible that the market price of corn PC is less than 
PNE  as shown in Figures 5a,b.12  In the case of water in Figure 5a, rectangular deadweight costs 
before the introduction of the loan rate is zero because water in the tax credit is 100 percent and 
so there is no ethanol production.  After the introduction of the loan rate, the rectangular 
deadweight costs are wL·(QL – CNE).  Hence, the loan rate creates rectangular deadweight costs in 
this case. 
In Figure 5b where there is no rectangular deadweight costs, the loan rate has no impact 
on rectangular deadweight costs.   
In summary, the tax credit decreases tax costs of the loan rate but increases consumer 
costs and incurs rectangular deadweight costs, part of which is due to the loan rate.  Meanwhile, 
the loan rate increases the tax costs of the tax credit, part of which cancels the reduced tax costs 
of the loan rate. Rectangular deadweight costs are an extra burden of the tax credit. The effect of 
the loan rate on rectangular deadweight costs are to both increase and decrease it (net effect is 
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ambiguous), to eliminate it, to create it, or to have no impact at all. The outcome strictly depends 
on which of the four possible initial equilibriums.  Thus it is vital to understand the prevailing 
equilibrium if one is to assess the welfare effects of the tax credit.   
4. An Algebraic Formulation of the Welfare Effects of the Tax Credit  
Because the tax credit for ethanol can have such disparate effects on welfare and trade, 
we derive the optimal tax credit for a large country exporter of corn and importer of oil for each 
of the situations described in Figures 2-5.  This serves as an important benchmark to understand 
how different market parameters determine the social welfare effects of the tax credit policy. 
Consider a demand sector represented by the indirect utility function ( ),V P Y , where P is 
the vector of prices and Y the level of income.  This indirect utility function generates the 
demand curve for corn,
1
D
P Yq V V= − , and for fuel 2DF P Yq V V= − . The supply sector can be 
represented by ( )Pπ  generating the supply curve for corn, 1Sq π= − , where the subscript 1 
denotes the derivative of the first element of P.  Likewise, the supply curve for gasoline is given 
by 2SGq π= − .  Additionally, let the foreign demand for corn be given by ( )X Xq q P= and the 
import supply of gasoline given by XGq .  Denote the tax credit given to ethanol producers as t , 
thus 'c cP P t= + . The optimal t  solves 
(12) ( )max ,gt V P P Y⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%  
subject to 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 ˆ ˆ,S D X S cY Y t q P q P q P q P Pδ π= − − − − +% % , 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ˆS X DS D XG c G c F cq P q P q P q P q P q P+ + − − =% % , 
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where { }ˆ max , ,c NEP P t P L= +  is the producer price for corn, ( )( ){ }1 1 ˆmax , DcP P t q Pπ−= + −%  is 
the consumer price for corn, { }max ,0L Pδ = − %  is the deficiency payment. The variable NEP  is 
defined implicitly as ( ) ( ) ( )S D XNE NE NEq P q P q P= + , L  is the loan rate, and ( )1 .Dq−  is the 
inverse of the demand function for corn consumption.  
Let iη  be the price elasticity of curve i.  Define the elasticity of excess supply of ethanol 
by 1
S D
S D X
X X
q q
q q
κ η η η= − − ,  the elasticity of excess demand for ethanol as 
2
S X
D S XG G
F G GD D
F F
q q
q q
κ η η η= − −  and define 3 1
S
S
X
q
q
κ κ η= − .  The corn devoted to ethanol is defined by 
S D XE q q q= − −  and the excess demand for imported gasoline and domestic ethanol fuel is 
given by SDF GM q q= − .  Solving the optimization conditions for (12) (see the appendix for a 
complete proof), we find: 
(i) if L NEP P L> > , then  
( ) ( ) 1 11 2 1 21 if 1 (CASE A)1 1
0 otherwise (CASE B)
c NE
D D
F F c
P PE ME M
q q P
t
κ κ
κ κ κ κ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤−− + + >⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
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(ii) if NE LL P P> > , then 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
3 3
3
3 2 3 2
1 if 1 (CASE A)
1 1
11 if 2 (CASE C1)
1 1
0 otherwise (CASE C2)
c
D D
F F c
c L
D D
F c F c
P E M LE M
q q P
t P PLE M E M
q P q P
κ κ
κ κ κ κ
κ κ κκ κ κ κ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤−− + + >⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎪⎪⎪= ⎨ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + > − + + >⎪ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
  
The formula defines the parameters that will minimize areas a and d in Figure 2a and area n in 
Figure 3b while at the same time maximize the area q.  If the oil price is exogenous, then 2κ  is 
infinite, leaving only the last term in each case. When the loan rate is not operational (as in 
CASE A above) the optimal tax credit is then given by ( )1 1CP κ − .  The more inelastic the 
domestic supply and non-ethanol demand (domestic and foreign) curves are, the higher the 
optimal tax credit or equivalently, the lower the social costs of the tax credit.  In this case, the tax 
credit has a relatively smaller impact on the amount of corn used for non-ethanol consumption, 
thus reducing the incidence of the tax.  In addition, the higher the share of corn exports relative 
to supply (weighted by the supply elasticity) and relative to domestic demand (weighted by the 
domestic non-ethanol demand elasticity), the lower the social cost of the tax credit. In this case 
corn importers carry the brunt of the corn price increase, the added revenue to domestic 
producers outweighing the loss to domestic consumers.  
 Because we assume the oil market absorbs all ethanol at a fixed world oil price, the 
elasticity of demand for ethanol is not a factor.  If the loan rate is operational (CASE C1), then 
the social cost of the tax credit will no longer depend on the supply of corn as this is fixed at the 
loan rate.  The optimal tax will now only depend on the properties of the domestic and foreign 
demand for corn, 3κ . 
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When oil prices are endogenous, then the results are conditioned by ( )E M− − , or the 
amount of fuel from foreign oil producers, and 21 kk , the ratio of the elasticities of excess supply 
and demand of ethanol.  The higher the imports of oil, the lower the social cost of the tax credit. 
In this case, the tax credit allows fuel consumption to substitute ethanol for imported oil, 
potentially improving the terms of trade (both lowering the imported oil price and raising the 
corn price for exports).  Additionally, the more negative the ratio of elasticities of excess supply 
and demand for ethanol, the lower the social cost of a tax credit. While the tax credit raises the 
corn price, the higher elasticity of supply suggests that corn producers can increase production to 
take advantage of the better terms of trade.  Alternatively, the lower (less negative) elasticity of 
demand for ethanol suggests that domestic consumers of fuel do not adjust their ethanol 
consumption very much, given the price decrease in fuel.  Thus the tax credit will more directly 
improve the international terms of trade.  Table 1 summarizes these results for each of the 
possible price contingencies described in Figures 2-5 that could affect the social welfare effects 
of the tax credit.   
5. An Empirical Illustration 
The basic market parameters calibrated and derived for the U.S. corn market are 
summarized in Table 2.  Annual data are presented for the crop years 2001/02 to 2006/07 for 
which the simulations were undertaken.  Data were obtained from the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA).  The supply and demand curves were calibrated assuming a constant 
elasticity of 0.4, -0.2 and -1.0 for corn supply, domestic demand and export demand, 
respectively.  An estimate of the corn price without ethanol production PNE is first required to 
determine water in the tax credit (with and without the loan rate).  Water is found to be positive 
in each year.  Note that the average water in the tax credit was $1.12/bu with no loan rate and 
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$0.89/bu with the loan rate. As a result, the tax credit caused ethanol production such that the 
average price of corn was higher by $0.31/bu, far less than the implied subsidy of $1.43/bu often 
attributed to the tax credit.13 
The first three columns in Table 3 show the various sources of deadweight costs with the 
deadweight cost triangle averaging $179 mil. and $38 mil. due to overproduction and 
underconsumption of corn, respectively.  However, rectangular deadweight costs averaged 
$1,067 mil. (column [3]) and are slightly lower than if there was no loan rate (column [4]).14  As 
described in the theory section, the loan rate has an ambiguous impact on rectangular deadweight 
costs. Comparing data in column [3] with [4], rectangular deadweight costs were higher without 
the loan rate in 2001/02 but lower in 2003/04. 
Average total tax costs were $3,229 mil. while average transfers from domestic and 
foreign consumers to corn producers were $2,221 and $633 mil., respectively.  Net social welfare 
was negative in every year, averaging -$683 mil. (column [12]).  Therefore, the improvement in 
the international terms of trade for corn exports (averaging $633 mil. per year) was more than 
offset by rectangular deadweight costs in each year (averaging $1,067 mil. per year). 
Additionally, the net social costs varied significantly, as it depends on the level of oil prices and 
the level of PNE (which depends on supply and demand shifts in the non-ethanol corn market). 
If there were no loan rate program, then the social costs of the tax credit program average 
$600 mil. (column [13]), slightly lower than before of $683 mil.  This is because there is no 
change in the market price of corn, exports or domestic demand for corn.  The tax credit and 
gasoline prices determine the price of corn.  A reduction in ethanol consumption compensates for 
the reduced production of corn due to the removal of the loan rate.  Triangular deadweight costs 
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in production decline, as do tax costs of the tax credit and while the change in rectangular 
deadweight costs is ambiguous in theory, it declines slightly in this empirical example.   
The final column of Table 3 shows that the net social costs of the loan rate program 
without the tax credit is $713 mil., more than if both polices were in place ($651 mil).  This 
means the tax credit generates a slight increase in net social welfare.  This is because of the 
international terms of trade improvement of $1,205 per year (column [9] minus column [10]). 
The United States could easily obtain this social gain by restricting exports instead and not 
having the tax credit, saving both $1,067 mil. in annual rectangular deadweight costs and $3,934 
mil. in annual costs to domestic consumers of (column [7] minus [8]). There are other costs of 
the ethanol tax credit not accounted for like the general equilibrium effects of a spike in food 
prices increasing the inefficiency of taxes on labor (Goulder and Williams 2003). The empirical 
simulation presented here is only meant to illustrate the properties of the theoretical model for a 
single sector and its interaction effect with a price contingent farm subsidy. 
If only the tax credit was in place, then tax costs would have averaged $1,523 mil. 
(column [6] in Table 3), implying the loan rate increased the annual tax costs of the tax credit by 
an average of $290 mil.15  Meanwhile, the tax credit reduced the average annual tax costs of 
deficiency payments, resulting in a net savings of $2,483 mil. in tax costs.  But the tax credit 
incurs rectangular deadweight costs of the tax credit average about $1,082 mil. and increased 
costs to domestic consumers of $3,934 mil.   
Another caveat of the analysis is the assumption that the loan rate set by politicians 
would not be affected by the tax credit. However, much higher oil and corn prices (and prices for 
related crops) give politicians an incentive to increase loan rates compared to a situation of no 
tax credit and lower crop prices with burgeoning taxpayer costs.  As shown in Swinnen and de 
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Gorter (1998), estimates of the welfare effects of one policy assuming the level of the other 
policy is unaffected can be seriously biased.  For example, the recent House Farm Bill proposes 
an increase in loan rates and target prices for several crops.  If the tax credit did not exist, ethanol 
and hence corn prices would be lower and tax costs of price contingent subsidies higher.  As a 
result, Congress may otherwise have been proposing lower price supports.  Hence, the 
counterfactual may be very different so caution should be exercised in attributing the social 
benefits of the tax credit in reducing tax costs of price supports.  
The effects of a tax credit that varies with oil prices 
Because ethanol production is expanding so rapidly and is expected to reach 12 billion 
gallons by 2010 (Elobeid et al. 2006), the implied tax costs will be $6 bil.  Hence, to limit 
taxpayer exposure, the idea of a variable tax credit has been proposed in Congress (e.g., Senator 
Lugar 2007) and by academics (e.g., Tyner and Quear 2006).  Following Tyner and Quear 
(2006), we analyze the implications of a scheme where the tax credit is zero once the price of oil 
reaches $60/barrel and increases 2.5 cents per gallon for each $ per barrel price decline.  With an 
exogenous 20 percent decrease in oil prices for the year 2006/07, water is the same under the two 
scenarios (a fixed versus variable tax credit) but ethanol production is higher with the variable 
tax credit.  The increase in rectangular deadweight costs are offset by the relative terms of trade 
improvement in corn exports with the variable tax credit.  Market prices for corn decline in each 
scenario by different amounts but the tax costs of the farm subsidy programs remain zero as loan 
rates and target prices are not triggered in either case.16  Although consumers lose more with the 
variable tax credit, farmers benefit an extra $1.3 bil. while the net social welfare cost is $103 mil.  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Many countries are implementing a variety of policies to increase biofuel use with 
consumption tax credits being a prominent method amongst them.  Hence, it is very important to 
understand the effects of such a policy on the markets for agricultural products, biofuels and oil 
and on economic welfare.  To this end, this paper develops a unique general theory to analyze 
the efficiency and income distribution effects of a tax credit for biofuels.  It is a particularly 
important issue for other countries in the world where gasoline taxes are often far higher than the 
U.S. case analyzed here.  Therefore, rectangular deadweight costs can be even higher in these 
countries.  A stylized model of the U.S. corn market indicates that annual average rectangular 
deadweight costs for 2001-2006 was $1,056 mil., in addition to the traditional triangular 
deadweight costs typically calculated in economic welfare studies. 
This paper shows that the tax credit reduces costs of the loan rate program but net tax 
savings may be negative because of foregone tax revenues due to the tax credit itself.  Tax 
savings in farm subsidies are replaced by increases in costs to corn consumers and by part of the 
tax costs of the tax credit (both due to and independent of the loan rate).  The other part of the tax 
cost of the tax credit represent rectangular deadweight costs, part of which is generated by the 
loan rate.  
The effect of the loan rate on rectangular deadweight costs are to both increase and 
decrease it (net effect is ambiguous), to eliminate it, to create it, or to have no impact at all.    
Rectangular deadweight costs increase because of the loan rate (as ethanol production expands 
with a given level of water) but at the same time decreases the rectangular deadweight costs as it 
lowers the water in the tax credit for a given level of ethanol production. We prove that the effect 
of price supports on rectangular deadweight costs depends on whether there is ex ante or ex post 
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water in the tax credit.  Two out of the four outcomes are situations where ethanol production 
occurs only because of price supports. 
Furthermore, we show how the welfare effects of a tax credit depends critically on 
whether the country is a large country importer or exporter in either the agricultural good used in 
biofuel production or oil.  For large countries (or for the combined effect of all small countries), 
terms of trade effects in either the oil or the agricultural markets can be positive or negative, 
depending on the trade status in each market.  Algebraic expressions for the effects of these and 
other market parameters on the impact of the tax credit on efficiency and transfers are formally 
derived.   
The model presented in this paper allows one to analyze the implications of several other 
policy issues.  For example, it is important to understand the impacts of a tax credit on 
international trade because of the recent controversy over how the U.S. ethanol “subsidy” of 51 
cents per gallon should be treated by the WTO.  The model developed in this paper shows the tax 
credit increases the price of both ethanol and corn, thereby conferring no specific subsidy to nor 
harming either producers of ethanol or corn in the rest of the world.17  Only the oil industry can 
be potentially harmed by the subsidy attributed to a consumption tax credit for biofuels.   
The model is also well suited to form a basis for evaluating both the social benefits of the 
tax credit in reducing local pollution, greenhouse gas linked warming and oil dependency and the 
social costs in adding to traffic congestion, accidents and other negative externalities arising 
from more fuel consumption (Parry et al. 2007).  Hence, this paper provides a springboard to 
assess the efficacy of alternative policies like a gasoline tax in achieving multiple policy goals 
like reducing oil dependency and tax costs of farm programs, or improving farm incomes and 
environmental quality.   
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In future research, the model can be adapted to analyze other interesting issues, like the 
effects of subsidies for either ethanol production or R&D of new technologies, and of policies 
that shift the non-ethanol corn demand curve to the right (import quotas on sugar increases the 
demand for corn syrup) or that shift the corn supply curve left (subsidies for other crops).  In 
addition to including more agricultural sectors, future research should also relax some 
assumptions by allowing for decreasing returns to scale in ethanol production, and for 
endogenous biofuel imports and variation in the additive value of ethanol.   
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                         Figure 2: Market Equilibrium with a Tax Credit  
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           Figure 3: Welfare Economics of a Tax Credit  
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Table 1: Price Contingencies for the Social Welfare Effects of the Tax Credit 
 
CASE A 
[Figures 2,3] 
CASE Ba 
CASE C1 
[Figures 4,5] 
CASE C2 
,c NEP t P L+ >  ,NE cP P t L> +  ,c NEL P t P> +  
Effective 
Producer Price 
Gasoline market drives 
producer corn price 
Gasoline price has 
no effect on corn 
producers 
Loan rate determines supply 
price for corn 
( )( )1 1
c
D c
P t
q P tπ−
+ >
+
 
( )( )1 1
c
D NE
P t
q Pπ−
+ <
 ( )( )1 1
c
D
P t
q Lπ−
+ >
 ( )( )1 1
c
D
P t
q Lπ−
+ <
 
Effective 
Consumer Price Gasoline price 
transmits to corn 
consumers 
 
Gasoline price has 
no effect on corn 
consumers 
 
Gasoline 
price 
transmits to 
corn 
consumers 
 
Gasoline price 
has no effect 
on corn 
consumers 
 
a Because there is no ethanol production, there is no link between corn and gasoline prices. 
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Corn If no ethanol No loan rate With loan rate
Dd X E QC QL PC PNE w wL
2001/02 6,930 1,904 668 9,270 9,502 1.97 1.85 1.31 1.09 955 1,195
2002/03 6,575 1,587 804 8,966 8,415 2.32 2.05 1.16 - 1,150 0
2003/04 7,133 1,899 1,057 10,067 10,089 2.42 2.10 1.11 0.82 1,512 134
2004/05 8,666 1,818 1,323 11,521 11,807 2.06 1.81 1.23 0.84 1,892 2,868
2005/06 7,362 2,147 1,603 10,436 11,112 2.00 1.78 1.23 0.79 2,292 4,300
2006/07 6,395 2,200 2,150 10,745 8,926 3.10 2.36 0.69 - 3,075 0
average 7,177 1,926 1,268 10,167 9,975 2.31 1.99 1.12 0.89 1,813 1,416
 --- $ per bushel ---  --mil. $--
Consumption
Domestic 
Non-ethanol Exports
Taxpayer costs 
Production at
Market 
price
Loan 
rate
Tax credit Deficiency payments
Ethanol
Prices  'water' in tax credit
 - - - mil. bushels - - -
Table 2: Corn Market Outcomes
 
Source: USDA; calculated
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If no LDPs If no tax credit
Total Total
Total No tax credit Total No tax credit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
2001/02 55 5 $727 $571 2,150 623 821 -1604 226 -513 2,415 -562 -364 -589
2002/03 57 22 $933 $933 1,150 1150 1,770 0 427 0 2,356 -585 -585 0
2003/04 92 31 $871 $1,153 1,646 1480 2,253 -2190 600 -734 3,534 -395 -670 -860
2004/05 157 27 $1,117 $1,229 4,760 1484 2,125 -3159 446 -866 4,723 -855 -879 -1083
2005/06 317 19 $1,265 $1,119 6,592 1325 1,640 -3323 478 -1320 6,607 -1,123 -712 -1744
2006/07 397 124 $1,489 $1,489 3,075 3075 4,716 0 1,622 0 7,527 -388 -388 0
average 179 38 1,067 1,082 3,229 1,523 2,221 -1,713 633 -572 4,527 -651 -600 -713
producti
on
consumpt
ion
Domestic
Rectangular
(effect of tax 
credit)
(effect of 
LDPs)
Triangular
Change in net social welfare
Net gain
Transfers to producers
If tax credit 
only
Taxpayers Consumers 
Foreign
Table 3: Transfers and Deadweight Costs of Ethanol Tax Credit and Loan Deficiency Payments ($ mil.)
Total
Deadweight Costs
If tax credit 
only
  
Source: calculated 
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Appendix 
 
The resulting first order conditions can be written 
(A1)
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1 1
ˆ
0
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P P s q P q P q P q Pq q q t
t t t P t P t P t P t
q P q P q P
P t P t P t
δ
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If either Pˆ
t
∂
∂  or 
P
t
∂
∂
%
 are non-zero then we can solve (A1) for λ   
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 The definitions { }ˆ max , ,c NEP P t P L= +  and ( ){ }1 ˆmax , DcP P t q P−= +% , and 
{ }0~max , PLδ −=  imply the following contingencies: 
 (i) If ,c NEP t P L+ > then ˆ cP P t= + , cP P t= +% , 0δ = , and substituting into (A2) obtains  
 
( )
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S D
D D S S X S D X
F G X X
c
S DS X D S D
S D XS X D S D XG G F
G G F X XX X
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q qq q q q q
q q Pt
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q qP P P q q
η η η
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 (ii) If c NEL P t P> + >  or NE c LL P P t P> > + >  then Pˆ L= , cP P t= +% , cL P tδ = − − , and  
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substituting into (A2) obtains 
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D
D D S S X D X
F G X
c
DS X D D
D XS X D D XG G F
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qq q q q
qP P P q
η η
η ηη η η η η
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(iii) If NE L cL P P P t> > > +  then Pˆ L= , LP P=% , LL Pδ = − .  The tax credit does not appear  
in (A1), hence an optimum obtains when 0t = . 
(iv) If ,NE cP P t L> + then ˆ NEP P= , NEP P=% , 0δ = .  The tax credit does not appear in (A1), 
hence an optimum obtains when 0t = .█ 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Exempted or reduced biofuel excise taxes cover 65 percent of total world fuel consumption and are known to be in 
effect in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, EU, Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Paraguay, 
Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Uruguay and the United States (Redondo 2007; Kojima et al. 
2007; UNCTAD 2006; Steenblik and Simón 2007; Rothkopf 2007). To help achieve EU wide biofuel consumption 
targets, 19 Member States have implemented excise tax exemptions and another 5 are planning to do so (EC 2007).  
 
2 The U.S. biofuel tax exemption was changed to a tax credit in 2004 but this was a change in implementation only 
and does not affect the economics of the program. The term “tax credit” is used hereafter in this paper. 
 
3 The import tariff on ethanol is another potential gain in the U.S. terms of trade but we assume ethanol imports are 
exogenous in the model. The tariff was implemented to offset the benefit exporters would otherwise obtain from the 
higher price of ethanol induced by the tax credit. 
 
4 Although we refer to the U.S. ethanol market as we develop our theory in this paper, it is only an example as the 
model can be applied to any biofuel market with a tax credit. For small countries, the oil price is fixed and there may 
be no terms of trade effect in the agricultural product market.  Indeed, the effect of U.S. ethanol policy on the world 
price of oil is empirically small for historical levels of ethanol production, even though the United States is a large 
country importer of oil.  
 
5 Eidman (2007), Miranowski (2007) and Schnitkey et al. also provide estimates of a linear corn-oil price breakeven 
relationship. 
 
6 Ethanol is a substitute for gasoline derived from petroleum. The term “fuel” in this paper refers to the 
ethanol/gasoline mixture. Ethanol can be up to 10 percent of the fuel mixture in traditional combustion engines with 
virtually no modifications required.   
 
7 The tax credit is not adjusted to a BTU basis because gasoline stations do not always label the ethanol content nor 
do most consumers convert the advertised price into a BTU basis. However, this is not the case in other countries, 
notably Brazil, and will likely change in the future for the United States as well when ethanol becomes a much 
larger share of fuel use. The model will then have to be adjusted accordingly.  
 
8 In cases where water in the tax credit does not exist, in addition to the tax costs of increased ethanol production 
induced by the tax credit that displaces gasoline consumption, taxpayers would also forego revenues on ethanol that 
would have been produced without the tax credit.  
 
9 World prices of oil decline and as an importer, the United States benefits as a result. Normally, an optimal import 
tariff is a subsidy on domestic oil production and an equal tax on domestic oil consumption. Here, the opposite 
occurs with domestic oil production taxed and domestic oil consumption subsidized. The outcome is unique because 
of the way in which the tax credit affects the ethanol and hence oil markets. 
 
10 Normally an export tax improves a country’s international terms of trade which is a tax on domestic production 
and an equal subsidy on domestic consumption. In the case evaluated here, the opposite occurs: corn producers are 
subsidized and domestic non-ethanol corn consumers are taxed because the ethanol tax credit increases the world 
market price for corn. 
 
11 Because U.S. ethanol production in 2006 is estimated to be 0.211 percent of world petroleum consumption, a 
fixed oil price in the empirical analysis is a plausible assumption.   
 
12 The mathematical expression for the effect of the tax credit t on net tax costs of the loan rate L in Figures 5a,b is 
the same as for that in Figures 4a,b but the effect of the loan rate on the net tax costs of the tax credit differs slightly 
and is now given by wL·(QL – CNE). 
 
13 In other words, PC exceeded PNE by $0.31/bu on average. 
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14 The estimates for deadweight loss triangles are in line with those obtained by Gardner (2003) and Martinez-
Gonzalez et al. (2007) but these studies omit rectangular deadweight costs. 
 
15 Annual average costs of the tax credit were $1,813 mil while that of the loan rate was $1,416 mil. (Table 2).   
 
16 Because corn prices decline more with a fixed tax credit, under other circumstances, there would be additional 
savings in tax costs of farm programs with a variable tax credit. 
 
17 Nevertheless, the United States notifies the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the WTO of 
the revenues foregone with the biofuel tax credit as a subsidy but categorizes it as an industrial product (IPC 2006).  
In regards to the recent case filed with the WTO on U.S. farm subsidies, Brazil argues the biofuel subsidy should be 
included in the domestic support disciplines of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture but the U.S. response was “the 
case is about agriculture, not ethanol” (GMF 2007).  Either way, our model shows that the tax credit would not 
constitute a specific subsidy nor have adverse effects on ethanol, corn or sugar producers in the rest of the world. 
Brazil should instead focus on the U.S.’s 54 cents per gallon import tariff on ethanol that prevents Brazil from taking 
advantage of this increase in ethanol price.  The elimination of the so-called “subsidy” due to the tax credit while 
maintaining the import tariff would make things even worse for Brazil.  
 
 

